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Abstract
The Space Station Freedom Data Management System 
consists of state-of-the-art hardware and software 
technology that exceeds the capabilities of earlier test 
tools and methods used to verify and certify man-rated 
space systems. New technologies and techniques are 
being developed to meet these challenges.
Introduction
Hardware and software technologies have advanced to a 
level that permits development of large and complex 
systems, such as the Space Station Freedom, which have 
a life of many years. The mission requirements over this 
period as well as maintainability dictate system 
architectures that are operationally flexible and 
accommodate technology insertion. In addition to 
crew/vehicle safety requirements for space systems, 
these systems may have other requirements that could 
not have been met cost effectively by older technologies.
Hardware technology for space applications has evolved 
to a level that allows reliable distributed processing over 
high speed LANs using commercial standards. These 
advancements provide much higher processing 
bandwidth, virtual memory, greater control and 
flexibility over the allocation and distribution of 
processing functions, and a growth path consistent with 
industrial directions.
It is now practical to develop real-time software upon a 
base of mostly commercial products. Using an 
operating system, such as UNIX*, can provide a 
standard execution environment that is compatible with 
other commercial products. This will allow a reduction 
in the cost of ground support and development 
environment. The use of newer high order languages, 
such as Ada, coupled with modem software engineering 
practices, allows software developers to tackle and 
control large software development efforts. Ada's high 
level of abstraction and strong typing can make the 
software program more understandable and prevent the 
introduction of many errors.
These advancements in technology, however, have 
outpaced our testing technology. Computer hardware 
designs may preclude the use of processor control and 
visibility tools used in previous manned space programs. 
Software technologies, designed to exploit the increased 
capabilities of hardware and to support software 
engineering principles, may use methods including 
dynamic memory allocations and optimization that can 
add to verification difficulties. There are also features of 
the Ada language that, if used improperly (but legally in 
an Ada sense), may lead to software that is difficult to 
lest or perhaps even untcstablc.
This paper addresses these situations and presents 
testing strategies that arc being validated for use on 
space systems software.
*UNIX is a registered trademark of UNIX System Laboratories in the United States and other countries.
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Brief Overview of the 
Space Station Data 
Management System
The Space Station Data Management System (DMS) is 
comprised of both hardware and software elements that 
provide all of the communication, object management, 
system control, and user services to support the flight 
application software that controls the operation of the 
Space Station Freedom. A brief description of the
architecture follows.
DMS Architecture
It was determined during the Phase B portion of the 
Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) that the 
requirements of the DMS could be best satisfied by a 
distributed architecture which implemented a number of 
military and commercial standards in the data 
processing field. Figure 1 shows the DMS architecture 
chosen for the SSFP.
DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DMS)
The DMS architecture consists of a core network and a 
payload global network implemented using a dual ring 
fiber optic topology that conforms to the Fiber 
Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) standards. The 
communications protocol that was chosen conforms to 
ihe Open Systems Interconnect standards (ISO/OSI). 
The core and payload networks arc physically and 
functionally separated by a bridge. Local processing 
environments, required by the Space Station process 
control applications, arc provided by processing nodes 
with Local Area Networks (LANs) for the dedicated
command and control functions required. The LANs arc 
implemented using the MIL-STD-1553B linear bus 
topology and communications protocol.
Figure 2 provides a functional depiction of the 
architecture . It can be clearly seen that the DMS 
provides three distinct data process domains as well as 
the characteristics of each domain. Both the information 
management and the process control domains consist of 
processing elements that arc constructed from a standard 
inventory of cards. Figure 3 presents a more detailed
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view of the card types and iheir arrangement in the 
processing elements. Of particular interest are the 
Embedded Data Processors (EDPs) which are common 
to all the elements. It is within the EDPs that the DMS 
and applications software is executed.
The EDPs are the space application equivalent of the 
IBM PS/2 Model 80 personal computer. The processing 
unit of the EDP is the Intel 386 processor. The Intel 386 
was chosen because it is a commercial standard used 
throughout industry; it provides a lasting technology 
that has a growth path, and it provides the processing 
flexibility required by the SSFP. The Intel 386SX 
processor was chosen for the multiplexer/demultiplexer 
(MDM) units.
The software architecture employed in the SSFP is 
presented in Figure 4. The architecture is implemented 
through a set of common system service functions used 
by all users and a set of applications software specific to 
the process control function being performed. The 
common system services provided by the DMS consist 
of the following items:
1) Runtime Services
2) Global Communications Services
3) Local Bus I/O and Applications Communications
4) Human User Interface
5) File Services
6) Hardware Management
7) Data Management
8) Operating System/Ada Runtime Environment 
(OS/ARTE)
9) Network Operating System (NOS)
10) Standard Services (STSV)
11) User Support Environment (USE)
12) Data Storage and Retrieval (DSAR)
13) Systems Management (SM)
To minimize development costs and provide a system 
consistent with future software technologies, 
Commcrcial-Off-The-Shclf (COTS) software products 
were chosen where feasible. As a result, a COTS UNIX 
operating system was chosen as the kernel for the
OS/ARTE and modifications were made to the kernel to 
support specific interfaces. Additionally, Ada was 
specified by NASA as the programming language for 
SSFP.
Man-Rated Software 
Systems Testing
Testing of man-rated software systems is extremely 
critical because human lives are dependent on those 
systems. Strict procedures must be implemented and 
adhered to so that the system integrity will be 
maintained.
Fault Avoidance/Fault 
Tolerance
Two basic strategies exist to develop software to deal 
with faults for this environment. A fault is any failure in 
the system that leads to an error in the way information is 
processed. The first and most common strategy is fault 
avoidance. Software developed for earlier NASA 
spacecraft, such as the Space Shuttle, was developed 
with this strategy. This approach places a significant 
burden on software testing throughout the development 
phase. Each software product, from the requirements 
and design specification to the object code executing in 
the actual flight hardware, must be rigorously verified. 
This process can be expensive and can increase the 
relative cost of software from about 20 percent to as 
much as 40 percent.
The second strategy to handle faults is fault tolerance. 
This approach requires that faults be detected and 
recognized. The system must isolate the fault to prevent 
its effects from propagating to other parts of the system. 
The system must also provide some reconfiguration of 
the system lo continue functioning until the fault can be 
eliminated. Unlike fault avoidance, this approach places 
a much greater burden on the design team to identify the 
classes of faults and design software to handle the 
detection, recognition, isolation, and reconfiguration 
functions. The fault tolerant approach is not used in lieu 
of fault avoidance, but in addition to it. While the fault 
avoidance strategy seeks to produce "error free" 
software, the fault tolerant strategy anticipates potential 
system failures such as communication channel failures, 
errors in man-machine interaction, and hardware 
component failures. It introduces another level of test 
concepts, policies, methods, and technology necessary 
to deal with the added complexity of the system.
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DMS Integration and Test 
Methodology
The DMS integration and test methodology has evolved 
from previous manned space flight programs including 
Shuttle, Skylab, and Saturn/Apollo. The primary 
experience gained through the Shuttle program has been 
the major influence in the derivation of this 
methodology. It provides valuable information on not 
only the integration and lest phase but also an 
organizational model to best ensure a complete and 
adequate test program.
The primary objectives of the integration and test 
methodology can be summarized in three key points.
1) Demonstrate that the DMS adheres to the letter of 
the customer's requirements
2) Assure the DMS performs and supports the users in 
accordance with the customer's operational 
expectations
3) Provide software that is "error free*'
The first two objectives are quantifiable since they can 
be explicitly tested. Specific test plans and scenarios 
developed to cover all documented requirements can be 
implemented and a one-to-one mapping of tests to 
requirements can be established and maintained. The 
third objective is more nebulous and, as experience has 
shown, can only be approached asymptotically. How 
rapidly and efficiently this goal is reached is dependent 
on how effectively an organization is structured to 
address the following areas:
1) Early definition and application of programming 
standards and techniques
2) Establishment of tests, audits, and code inspections
3) Early definition and implementation of lest tools, 
simulators, and other support software proven by a 
thorough lest plan and maintained through 
configuration control
4) Configuration control of the build and integration 
of the evolving software system
5) Configuration control of ihe implementation and 
retest of the software changes resulting from 
requirements upgrades and discrepancy corrections
6) Step-wise integration and testing of the system
The DMS organization has been developed from the 
model provided by Shuttle. An organizational element 
independent of software development, called 
Integration, Test, and Verification (IT&V), has been 
established to focus on the integration and test of DMS. 
IT& V is cast in the role of the conscience of the project 
and fosters a definite but healthy adversary relationship 
between iisejf and the development organization.
The IT& V organization performs two major categories 
of tests on the DMS. The first category is the detailed 
requirements testing which covers each "shall" in the 
requirements document. A requirements cross reference 
matrix is developed and delivered to the customer which 
maps the test cases to the requirements tested. The 
second test category is system testing. System testing 
includes testing the system in a realistic operational 
environment, and subjecting it to nominal and 
off-nominal stress conditions.
To accomplish both types of testing, the test tools and 
lest environment must provide a number of basic 
capabilities. To control the conditions of the testing and 
establish the appropriate processing state, a capability 
must be provided to set the initial state parameters of the 
system. To acquire the proper data for evaluation of the 
test results, visibility into the data locations within 
memory must be provided. Additionally, knowledge of 
the system state over time must be provided as a 
potential triggering mechanism for setting the desired 
processing conditions or acquiring the desired data.
The lest control, data visibility and access capabilities 
must be provided in a manner that supports both 
categories of testing being accomplished in a complete 
system configuration and in an "unaltered 1 stale. An 
unaltered state simply means the system under test must 
beinihc configuration expected lo fly. Additionally, all 
controls of the system under tesl required lo establish the 
lest state, control the tcsi conditions, and extract the 
required test data must not be detectable and must noi 
affcci ihc flighi state. With these test constraint and 
system element features, it is clear ihat there arc specific 
challenges thai must be dealt with from a tesiing poini of 
view.
System testing can be defined in terms of six different 
levels. These levels arc described below.
Level 1 Testing (Unit)
During development, specific testing is done to ensure 
thai mathematical equations and logic paths provide the 
results cxpcclcd.
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Level 2 Testing (Functional)
This development test activity is similar to Level 1 but 
expanded to include all interfacing modules required to 
satisfy a specific user input command.
Level 3 Testing (Subsystem)
Level 3 Testing demonstrates the ability of a particular 
subsystem to execute all of its nominal functions. 
Multiple functions are tested as well as timing.
Level 4 Testing (System)
Level 4 Testing exercises enure systems to test 
operational sequences and monitor system performance.
Level 5 Testing (Release Validation)
This activity involves repeating all of the Level 4 tests in 
the actual flight hardware environment.
Level 6 Testing (Design Validation)
Level 6 Testing (usually performed independantly of 
prior levels) involves testing the system to design 
requirements including timing and performance 
requirements.
Space Station Testing 
Objectives
Figures 5 through 8 depict the testing objectives at each 
level for the DMS.
Typical Testing 
Methodologies Used
Black Box
Black Box testing implies the testing of software simply 
by exercising all external interfaces to the Box upon 
which the software is executing. The advantages of this 
testing method are that usually fewer, less complex test 
devices arc needed and no instrumentation of the 
software under test is required. The disadvantages arc 
limited visibility into the software execution and the 
extent of the lest suite required to test the potential 
ranges of all interfaces.
White Box
White Box testing implies the testing of software by 
monitoring and controlling its execution on the Box with
special test equipment The advantage of this testing 
method is that more visibility of the software is allowed; 
however, completely nonintrusive test devices are 
usually costly and do not always solve all of the testing 
dilemmas.
Space Shuttle Program
Both the hardware and software technology used on the 
Space Shuttle Program were unlike that of today's Space 
Station systems. The primary onboard Shuttle computer 
system is centered around IBM AP-101 General 
Purpose Computers (GPCs). Testing of the Space 
Shuttle flight software typically involved simulators 
communicating with the GPCs to drive external 
interfaces. The execution of software on the GPCs was 
monitored and tested primarily by stopping the GPC 
during an execution run and dumping data out of the 
machine to be analyzed later.
Because the GPC contained a single processor, all 
software execution could be frozen during a simulation. 
Once the appropriate data was collected, the GPC was 
"started" again. Because of the controls allowed in the 
interface test equipment that stopped the GPC processor, 
software execution on the GPC was not affected. In 
short, the software never "knew" that it had been 
stopped.
Some flight software modifications were made to 
accomodate the test environment. To accomplish a GPC 
stop during certain execution states of the processor, 
elements of the flight software were instrumented to 
support the test environment. NASA fell that this "test 
scar" was acceptable because of the test capabilities 
provided.
The Space Shuttle software testing methodology is a 
good example of pure "white box" testing at all lest 
levels.
Challenges to Test Space 
Station Software
The Space Station Freedom Program, as described 
previously, employs a distribulcd architecture for DMS 
services and application software. The software used to 
implement this system will be written in Ada and will 
execute in a Unix environment. The challenges of 
testing such a system are described below.
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Language
In previous languages used on man-rated programs, 
limitations on program behavior ruled out many 
potential faults, since the language could not express 
certain types of processing.. With Ada, many of these 
built-ifi restrictions fiave been eliminated. Thft Ad^ 
language has its own restrictions, recognizes certain 
abstractions explicitly, and provides a framework for 
dealing with them.
Ada Risk Areas
Ada's high level of abstraction, dynamic allocation, and 
optimization makes low level testing (i.e. use of compile 
time absolute addresses, memory dumps, and assembly 
debugging) impractical except for subprograms. Also, 
100 percent deterministic paths may not be guaranteed 
in an asynchronous, multitasking program.
The Ada language provides the opportunity to improve 
program quality if it is properly used. Its features allow 
software engineers to develop programs that are more 
understandable, reliable, and maintainable. However, 
there are features that, if used indiscriminately in real 
time systems, can lead to software programs that are 
difficult to test. These are listed below.
1) Strong typing and subtype mechanisms may create 
inefficient execution making it more difficult to 
validate performance requirements
2) Subprograms formed by composite functions can 
lead to unpredictable storage use
3) Subprograms with global variables or side effects 
result in interfaces that are difficult to test
4) Use of generics may not be consistent with design 
intent
5) Use of generics may be inefficient or make it 
difficult to analyze time and space use
6) Exceptions may lead to inefficient execution
7) Exceptions may lead to more complex interfaces 
making them more difficult to test
8) Behavior of predefined exceptions can sometimes 
be unpredictable
9) Tasking may lead to nondcicrministic behavior in 
time and space
10) Dynamic allocation of memory makes it more 
difficult to predict whether a program will meet its 
storage constraints
Software Technology
The UNIX Operating System (OS) and its associated 
Ada Run Time Environment (ARTE) provide a highly 
flexible, real-lime platform upon which the DMS 
services and user applications can execute. However, 
the unpredictability of the way in which the OS/ARTE 
schedules and manages the various software tasks 
executing in this environment produces many 
difficulties in testing these software elements.
UNIX Risks
The UNIX environment allows for run-time 
^configurability and shuffling of OS resources by 
employing the concept of Virtual Memory. A few of the 
features of UNIX and its use of Virtual Memory that 
produce testing difficulties are listed below.
1) . Lack of visibility into functions and operations 
being performed by the operating system
2) Inability to synchronize or stop all hardware 
elements and OS processes
3) Lack of determinism in task scheduling
4) Dynamic memory allocation
Hardware Technology
The distributed processing capabilities of the DMS are 
required to support the flexibility of multiple flight 
software applications and the various resources that 
they must access. Also, within each SDP, multiple 
processors arc required to meet the throughput and 
processing requirements of these applications. The 
complexity of such a system only increases the difficulty 
in testing software that executes in that environment. 
The major hardware architecture features of the DMS 
that induce risks in testing arc:
1) Distributed Processors
The major issues with testing software executing on 
a distributed processing system appear at the upper 
levels (4 - 6) of the test process.
2) Multiple Processors within an SDP
The major issues of testing software that executes 
on multiple processors within a single SDP affect 
testing at all levels.
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3) Pipelined Processors
The SDP primary processor is a pipelined 
processor. In simple terms, this means thai it will 
"feich" instructions from memory prior to their 
actual execution. This feature is necessary to 
achieve the processing power required of the SDP. 
Testing at all levels is affected due to the inability to 
control test operation based on actual instruction 
execution.
DMS Integration and 
Verification Methodology
The strategy for verifying the DMS requires a change in 
the verification paradigm. The old paradigm being that 
for the- integration and lest of Space ShutUe flight 
software. A discussion of the differences between the 
paradigms and recommended options for a modified 
verification methodology for Space Station DMS 
follows.
The Paradigm Shift
The former paradigm assumed a centralized processor, 
static allocation of memory, and a cyclic executive with 
high frequency control loops. All software was 
designed and tested for fault avoidance, and any flight 
software that only supported testing was minimized. 
Error free confidence in ihe software was principally 
achieved by demonstrating determinism by having 
system level visibility to all data. This was 
accomplished with various visibility tools through six 
levels of testing ranging from unit to system level. This 
was practical for the amount of flight software (less than 
100,000 lines of code) on the Shutilc. While hardware 
and software technology used in ihe DMS may prevent 
the use of older verification techniques at the system 
level, even if it were technically feasible, ihe amounl of 
flight software (approximately 900,000 lines of code of 
DMS software plus several hundred thousand lines of 
application software) and its distributed nature makes it 
cost prohibitive to use these techniques.
The current paradigm assumes a distributed processing 
system, dynamic allocation of memory, and an 
asynchronous executive with low frequency control 
loops. Besides application flight software, other 
mission software will be used to monitor and report the 
health and status of the system and to provide 
reconfiguration if a system fault occurs. Confidence in 
the software will be achieved by building upon a
hierarchy of verification methods and maintaining 
consistency between the development and execution 
environments. While verification al (he software unit 
level will rely on traditional and proven methods, higher 
levels of system testing will rely on trusted interfaces 
within applications, runtime, pre-runtime, and 
hardware systems. These interfaces specify the 
functional characteristics of the system. Once these 
interfaces are defined, verified, and basclined, they 
provide the coniexi for higher levels of program 
execution. The features of the health monitoring 
software can provide access to system data to support 
nonintrusive verification.
The levels and techniques of verification planned for ihe 
DMS are described below. While the reliability of some 
of these has been proven on prior space systems, other 
techniques are being developed and validated.
Approaches to Solving Test 
Challenges
The challenges posed above are very new to the lest 
requirements of man-rated software based programs. 
Some would consider this task to be much more 
challenging than that of the implementation of the 
system itself. Although these issues are still being 
addressed, a solid test approach is being implemented to 
effectively solve the issues with the lowest cost to the 
Space Station Program.
Test Philosophies
The general approach for testing Space Station software 
involves a combination of a black box and a while box 
mcihodology providing an extremely flexible 
environment that can be used to support each icsi level. 
Different elements of this environment are used to 
"certify" the system before stepping to the next level. 
Also, certain software implementation standards are 
being proposed thai would force the software lo be more 
"testable". A description of these tools and standards 
follows.
Test Tools
The basic environment for all levels of test is centered 
around a simulation host thai will provide ihe necessary 
processing power to simulate the required interfaces at 
each lesl level. The simulation host is attached to the 
DMS elements via interface hardware thai is of a similar 
archiiccturc base as ihe DMS itself. Nol only docs ihis
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reduce cost by utilizing reusable software in the 
interface equipment, but it provides for the capability to 
move functionality of the simulations down into the 
interface hardware to support throughput and processing 
requirements. Figure 9 depicts the test environment for 
Space Station software.
Simulation Host
The simulation host executes various models that are 
required to supply the missing elements in each test 
level. For example, at the lower test levels, more 
interface simulations and processing is required of the 
simulation host because only one SDP is used. At the 
highest test levels, the complete system is used in a fully 
integrated manner, therefore, minimal simulation 
equipment is needed.
The simulation host provides post-processing tools for 
analysis and correlation of simulated and real data.
The simulation host also provides the necessary tools to 
support the software symbolic referencing and cross 
debugging requirements.
Software Execution 
Monitoring/Breakpoint and 
Event Trapping
Software monitoring tools are provided for both the SDP 
and MDM elements of the DMS by the SDDU and 
MDM I/F subunits respectively. These elements 
provide the "white box" test capabilities.
System Development and Diagnostic 
Unit (SDDU)
The SDDU provides a passive monitoring capability of 
software executing in an SDP by "listening'* to fetches 
that occur between the processor and memory. It can 
also be used to snap data directly from memory or patch 
over locations of memory. An "on-lhc-fly" capability is 
provided that allows data to be snapped or patched 
instantaneously based on a predefined event.
MDM Interface Unit
The MDM Interface Unit provides an internal debug 
interface to the MDM processor. It allows similar 
capabilities as the SDDU. The MDM Interface Unit also 
supports simulated sensor/effector I/O for up to five 
MDMs driven by host simulations.
Bus Monitors/Simulators
Bus monitors and simulators are provided for both the 
FDDI (global) and the 1553 (local) buses. These 
elements provide the "black box" test capabilities.
FDDI Network Monitor
This unit provides the capability to monitor traffic on the 
FDDI network based on triggers and filters specified by 
the simulation host
FDDI Network Simulator
This unit can simulate multiple or single nodes on the 
FDDI network. The higher levels of the network 
communication protocols are tested in this unit as well.
Local Bus Subunit
This unit can respond to requests for data over the 1553 
bus from an SDP as if a real MDM were connected. It 
can also simultaneously simulate a bus controller 
requesting data and a bus monitor recording traffic.
Test Approaches
The current proposed test approaches to meet each of the 
challenges described above utilizing these test tools are:
Ada
Some of the challenges of testing Ada could be solved 
through the selection of a high-quality optimizing 
compiler to eliminate unnecessary run-time type 
checking and to implement subprogram calls with 
minimal overhead.
Most of the challenges of testing Ada impact the lower 
test levels and could be met through the use of a resident 
Ada debugger. Specifically, non-performance related 
requirements place on lower elements within software 
functionality could be verified for proper code path 
execution and expected results. Also, detailed equations 
within applications could be verified for accuracy given 
all ranges of possible inputs. The system level or 
performance related requirements would be verified 
with the existing non-intrusive tools described earlier.
Although there is some risk with this method in that the 
debugger could actually impact the test environment, the 
visibility provided by a debugger far outweighs these 
risks.
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UNIX -
Multiple approaches are being taken to address UNIX 
issues.
1) Again, a resident debugger is recommended for the 
lower test levels in areas that involve the Ada to 
UNIX interaction
2) Deterministic path labels are recommended for 
performance measurements and OS monitoring
3) Address resolution tools are being developed that 
allow the user to monitor software based on 
symbols. The virtual to physical addresses are 
resolved after the software is loaded
Multiple Processors
The approaches to address testing of software in a 
multiprocessor environment are:
1) The SDDU read and write "on-the-fly" capability 
is being recommended to capture data in real lime 
without having to stop software execution.
2) Applications are required to be self-starting and 
self re-starting.
3) The simulation host will support a "checkpoint" of 
journal data so that even with distributed 
processing, the system state can be recreated for 
problem resolution.
Software Implementation 
Standards
Ada
The majority of the risks of testing Ada could be 
minimized through the use of proper education and 
programming guidelines. A few of the recommended 
guidelines are included below.
1) Reduce the use of global variables. All data should 
be passed to a package through parameters.
2) Document all expected use of storage.
3) Develop generic packages, rather than a generic 
subprogram, and document all assumptions made 
about the properties of the generic parameters. 
Select a compiler that allows the programmer to
choose an implementation strategy for generics by 
means of a pragma.
4) Exceptions are pan of a module's interface and 
should be well documented. Exception handling 
and propagation should be planned as an overall 
strategy for maintaining system integrity. 
Exceptions should not be used for determining 
conditional processing in the normal execution of 
an algorithm.
5) Nondeterminism is inherent in any system with 
asynchronous events. The following guidelines are 
recommended for Ada tasks.
- Tasks should not depend on other tasks except 
at synchronization points.
- Task logic should not depend on the choice in a 
selective wait.
- Tasks should employ deadlock detection 
schemes.
Use monitor tasks to provide access to shared 
data to avoid race conditions.
Packages containing hidden variables should 
only be used by one task to avoid race 
conditions, otherwise use a monitor task within 
the package.
6) Use representation clauses to limit run time 
allocation of storage and use an exception handler 
to initiate recovery upon pre-defincd storage error 
exceptions.
Summary
The software testing objectives for the Space Station 
Freedom Program have initially been met by applying a 
philosophy of testing very similar to that of the Space 
Shuttle Program and through the use of a complex set of 
flexible tools and implementation standards.
The task of integrating and testing flight software for the 
SSFP is still in its early stages. Although many tools and 
capabilities exist or arc planned, the difficulties 
encountered during these early stages will most likely 
dictate the need lor additional support tools. In cases 
where tools arc unavailable or arc not cost effective, a 
change in the methodology of software testing and 
verification that deviates from the Space Shuttle 
metluxlology may be rcquirccd.
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